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Comment
EMERGING THEORIES OF PROOF IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY:
RESOLVING THE PROBLEM OF IDENTIFYING DES
MANUFACTURERS
I. INTRODUCarON
In 1947, diethylstilbestrol (DES), a synthetic estrogen 1 was approved
by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)2 for use as a miscar-
riage preventative to be marketed on an experimental basis.3 By
1952, when the need for FDA approval was dropped because DES
was no longer considered a new drug,4 123 drug companies had ob-
1. Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46
FORIHAM L. Rtxv. 963, 963 & n.l (1978). Estrogen is a female sex hormone
which was found to be useful in the treatment of menopausal and other female
disorders. Id. at 963 nn.l & 2. The development of synthetic estrogens was
considered a major advance since, compared to their natural counterparts, they
are less expensive and may be administered orally. Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly &c Co.,
175 N.J. Super. 551, 562, 420 A.2d 1305, 1310 (1980). Although courts com-
monly refer to both stilbestrol and dienestrol as DES, they are actually two
different drugs, only the former of which is properly denominated diethylstil-
bestrol (DES). Id. at 561, 420 A.2d at 1310. DES was first sold in the United
States in 1941, and was used at that time for the treatment of menopausal
symptoms. See Comment, supra, at 963 n.2 & 976.
2. See Comment, supra note 1, at 976. Federal law allowed the marketing
of a new drug only if a new drug application (N.D.A.) both had been filed
with the FDA, and had become effective. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act of 1938, ch. 675, §505(b), 52 Stat. 1052 (1938). See Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 603-04, 607 P.2d 924, 931-32, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132,
140, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 285 (1980). A new drug was defined as one not
generally recognized as safe. 26 Cal. 3d at 603, 607 P.2d at 931-32, 163 Cal.
Rptr. at 139-40. An N.D.A. became effective automatically if it was not dis-
approved within a specified period of time. Id. at 604, 607 P.2d at 932, 163
Cal. Rptr. at 140. In 1962, the law was changed to require affirmative ap-
proval of an application before a new drug could be marketed. Id. Although
the drug laws in effect prior to 1962 did not require proof of effectiveness
before a drug could be marketed, they did require proof of safety. Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, ch. 675, § 505(b), 52 Stat. 1052 (1938).
3. See Comment, supra note 1. at 963. Early studies indicated that DES
was potentially effective to reduce miscarriages; the validity of these studies was
subsequently questioned because of inadequate controls and later studies failed
to confirm the earlier results. Id. at 963 n.2. When the effectiveness of DES
was again tested in the late 1960's, the drug was categorized as "possibly effec-
tive," which meant that "there [was] little evidence of effectiveness under any
of the criteria stated . . ." Id., quoting NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NA-
TIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, DRUG EFFICACY STUDY 7 & 42 (1969).
4. See Comment, supra note 1, at 964 n.3.
(997)
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tained FDA approval.5 The ultimate number of companies involved
in the market, however, has been estimated to be as high as 300.6
The FDA banned the use of DES as a miscarriage preventative in 1971
following a finding that the daughters of women who used DES during
pregnancy were more likely to contract vaginal or uterine cancer than
the daughters of non-users.
7
Numerous suits have been filed against DES manufacturers by
these women with cancerous and pre-cancerous conditions.8 However,
given the fact that the adverse effects of DES cannot be detected until after
a latency period of ten to twelve years,9 victims are often unable to iden-
tify the manufacturer whose product was sold to their mothers. 10 While
this inability has caused the dismissal of many of the DES suits, 1 two
recent cases have permitted the plaintiff to proceed to trial using novel
liability theories.12
5. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 604, 607 P.2d 924, 932,
163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 140, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 285 (1980).
6. See Comment, supra note 1, at 964 n.3.
7. See id. at 964 n.5 & 965. The incidence of adenocarcinoma in DES-
daughters has been estimated at from one in 250 to one in 1,000 compared
with an estimated overall incidence as low as one in 10,000. Id. at 965 n.7,
citing B. SEAMAN, WOMAN AND THE CRISIS IN SEX HORMONES 29 (1977). The
majority of these women have other abnormalities, most commonly adenosis,
which may be a pre-cancerous condition. Comment, supra note 1, at 965 &
n.10.
8. Comment, supra note 1, at 966-67. One source estimates the number
of suits pending at 80 to 100. Id.
9. See Sindell v. Abbotts Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 594, 607 P.2d 924,
925, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 133, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 285 (1980).
10. See Comment, supra note 1, at 972 n.27. The time lapse has resulted
in the destruction of medical records. Id. at 972 n.6. "Doctors have died,
hospitals have gone out of business, records have been destroyed, mothers, if
they ever knew, have forgotten they took the drug." Reply Brief for Appellant
at 3, Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 85 Cal. App. 3d 1, 149 Cal. Rptr. 138
(1978).
11. See, e.g., Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (com-
palaint against Eli Lilly dismissed because of lack of proof that it had manu-
ctured the DES); McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 150 Cal.
Rptr. 730 (1978) (summary judgment for defendant affirmed where plaintiff
was unable to offer evidence identifying manufacturer); Fields v. Eli Lilly &
Co., No. C 122248 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 1977) (motions for summary judgment
granted with respect to most defendants). In several instances, trial courts
have refused to recognize a cause of action where the suit involves multiple
defendants. See, e.g., Rheingold v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., No. 74 Civil
3420 (CHT) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 1975); Krieger v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 21235/76
(N.Y. Sup. Ct., filed 1976); Kaufman v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 21234/76 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct., filed 1976).
12. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 285 (1980); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175
N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305 (1980). Both cases were before the court on pro.
cedural motions and neither has been tried on the merits. See notes 67-123
and accompanying text infra.
[VOL. 26: p. 997
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This comment will first review three rubrics which relieve negli-
gence plaintiffs from identifying the specific tortfeasor - concert of
action,' 3 alternative liability 14 and enterprise liability.'5  Next, the
comment will examine three recent cases in which courts applied these
rubrics to DES actions.x6 Finally, the comment will analyze the rela-
tive merits of the approaches taken by the three courts.17
II. THREE THEORIES USED TO ExcusE PLAINTIFF FROM
IDENTIFYING THE SPECIFIC TORTFEASOR
In a cause of action for negligence, the plaintiff must prove that
-the injury was caused by the defendant's breach of duty.' 8 In a
product-liability negligence action, this generally entails identifying an
individual defendant as the manufacturer or seller of the injury-causing
item.'9 However, three theories have been recognized for excepting
the plaintiff from this general rule: concert of action,20 alternative lia-
bility 21 and enterprise liability.
22
A. Concert of Action
The concert of action doctrine developed to deter hazardous group
,conduct,2s and is based upon the premise that injury results from the dan-
gerous situation created by the negligent conduct of all the defendants.
2 4
-Once concert has been established, each defendant is held jointly and
:severally liable for the entire harm.25 Most commonly, the theory is
applied to cases involving racing on public highways to hold all par-
ticipants jointly and severally liable when a third party is struck by
13. See notes 23-31 and accompanying test infra.
14. See notes 32-51 and accompanying text infra.
15. See notes 52-66 and accompanying text infra.
16. See notes 67-132 and accompanying text infra.
17. See notes 133-55 and accompanying text infra.
18. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 236, 241 (4th ed. 1971).
19. Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d 1344, 1349, 1351-53 (1973). See also, 1 R. HuRsa
.& H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODucTs LIABILITY § 1.41, at 125 (2d ed.
1974).
20. See notes 23-31 and accompanying text infra.
21. See notes 32-51 and accompanying text infra.
22. See notes 52-66 and accompanying text infra.
23. See Comment, supra note 1, at 979.
24. Id.
25. W. PROSSER, supra note 18, at 291-92.
1980-81]
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one of the racers.28 However, it has also been applied to cases involving
pollution 2 7 and shooting accidents.
28
The Restatement of Torts has defined concert as follows:
§ 876. Persons Acting in Concert
For harm resulting to a third party from the tortious
conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he
(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or
pursuant to a common design with him, or
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach
of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement
to the other so to conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accom-
plishing a tortious result and his own conduct, separately
considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third
person. 29
26. See, e.g., Bierczynski v. Rogers, 239 A.2d 218 (Del. 1968) (defendant's
action held to be a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, although his car
did not make contact with that of the plaintiff, because he induced and
encouraged the tort); Lemons v. Kelly, 239 Ore. 354, 397 P.2d 784 (1964) (ap-
pellant liable, although his car did not collide with the plaintiff's, because the
race was cause of accident); Brown v. Thayer, 212 Mass. 392, 99 N.E. 237
(1912) (defendants liable for the death of pedestrian struck by one of them
although the plaintiff, because of a death statute, had to sue separately); Han-
rahan v. Cochran, 12 App. Div. 91, 42 N.Y. Supp. 1031 (1896) (defendants
liable because race created conditions that resulted in the accident). See gen-
erally, Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 1431 (1967). It is important to note that these
cases, unlike the present one, do not involve a problem of identification.
27. See, e.g., Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex.
251, 248 S.W.2d 731 (1952) (defendants who polluted the plaintiff's lake held
jointly and severally liable although they acted independently); Moses v. Town
of Morganton, 192 N.C. 102, 133 S.E. 421 (1926) (although defendants acted
independently, knowledge of what result their independent acts would have
upon the plaintiff's creek created a concert of action).
28. See, e.g., Moore v. Foster, 182 Miss. 15, 18 So. 73 (1938) (where two
constables wrongfully fired their guns at the plaintiff, it was not necessary for
the plaintiff to prove which defendant inflicted the wound); Reyher v. Mayne,
90 Colo. 586, 10 P.2d 1109 (1932) (both defendants liable where each fired
negligently at the plaintiff's decoy geese and one defendant injured the plain-
tiff); Oliver v. Miles, 144 Miss. 852, 110 So. 666 (1926) (hunters who each did
an unlawful act in pursuance of a common purpose were each liable for the
injury caused although it was not known whose shot injured the plaintiff);
Mangino v. Todd, 19 Ala. App. 486, 98 So. 323 (1923) (sheriff and his sureties
were each liable for an injury caused by one during an unlawful assault
because all were engaged in a common enterprise and aided, abetted and
encouraged each other); Benson v. Ross, 143 Mich. 452, 106 N.W. 1120 (1906)
(the plaintiff did not have to show which defendant fired the shot which
caused injury since the defendants acted in concert in engaging in shooting
practice in violation of a city ordinance). Presumably, all the defendants in
each of these cases would have been liable, even if it was known who fired
the shot causing injury, since concert did exist.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1977). The California courts
have based their test of concert on the First Restatement. In Orser v. George,
the defendant was held liable for the death of the plaintiff's decedent, even
though it had been established that the defendant's rifle could not have been
the cause of the fatal injury. 252 Cal. App. 2d 660, 668, 60 Cal. Rptr. 708,
[VOL. 26: p. 9971000
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*Mere knowledge of what another party is doing will not create con-
cert since there is no affirmative duty to interfere with another per-
-son's activities.8 0 Furthermore, a defendant must be proceeding tor-
tiously or negligently to be held liable under concert. 1
B. Alternative Liability
The alternative liability theory developed to relieve the plaintiff
-of the burden of establishing which of several defendants caused an in-
jury. 2 The basis for the theory was developed in Ybarra v. Span-
,gard83 where the plaintiff awoke after an appendectomy partially
paralyzed.84 Not knowing the person or the instrumentality which had
caused his injury, the plaintiff sued six doctors and nurses, each of
whom had been responsible for him at some point during his uncon-
sciousness.85 Although the defendants claimed that res ipsa loquitur
was inapplicable because of the number of defendants,86 the court ap-
plied the doctrine, stating: "Plaintiff was rendered unconscious for the
purpose of undergoing surgical treatment by the defendants: it is mani-
festly unreasonable for them to insist that he identify any one of them
-as the person who did the alleged negligent act." 31
714 (1967). The court held that liability may be established on a concert
theory when it is shown that the defendant knew that his companions' con-
duct constituted a breach of duty owed the decedent, that the defendant gave
.substantial assistance or encouragement to his companions, and that his conduct
itself was a breach of duty owed the decedent. Id. The California courts
have applied concert to a variety of factual situations. See, e.g., Loeb v. Kim-
merle, 215 Cal. 143, 9 P.2d 199 (1932) (action for assault and battery to hold
liable a defendant who did not physically participate); Weinberg Co. v. Bixby,
185 Cal. 87, 196 P. 25 (1921) (construction of embankments on both sides of
a river was a joint enterprise making both owners liable for wrongful diver-
,.sion of flood waters); Meyer v. Thomas, 18 Cal. App. 2d 299, 63 P.2d 1176
(1937) (action for conversion of a promissory note).
30. W. PROSSER, supra note 18, at 292.
31. Id. "One who innocently . . . does an act which furthers the tor-
tious purpose of another is not acting in concert with him." Id. at 292. (foot-
note omitted).
32. Id. at 243.
33. 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
34. Id. at 487, 154 P.2d at 688.
35. Id. at 487-88, 154 P.2d at 688.
36. Id. at 492, 154 P.2d at 690. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur relieves
the plaintiff from the burden of proving negligence. See W. PROSSER, supra
note 18, at 214. There are three pre-conditions to use of the res ipsa doctrine:
1) the accident must be one which does not ordinarily occur in the absence of
negligence; 2) the injury must have been caused by an instrumentality within
the defendant's exclusive control; and 3) the injury must not have been due
to any action of the plaintiff. Id. The defendants claimed that the second
-requirement had not been met, because where multiple defendants were pres-
ent, no one of them had exclusive control over the instrumentality. 25 Cal.
.2d at 489, 154 P.2d at 688-89. Ybarra was the first of a new line of cases
which relaxed this requirement and applied the doctrine in cases involving
multiple defendants. See Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 905 (1954).
37. 25 Cal. 2d at 492, 154 P.2d at 690. Nor was the plaintiff required to
-make an identification of the instrumentality causing injury, but had only to
1001-1980-81]
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The requirements of the alternative liability theory were set forth
in Summers v. Tice.3s The plaintiff in Summers was injured when
the two defendants independently fired in plaintiff's direction while
all three were hunting.39 Since the evidence adduced at trial was in-
sufficient to determine which shot had actually caused the injury,40 the
California Supreme Court held that, whereas the negligence of one of
them had injured the plaintiff, "a requirement that the burden of proof
on [causation] be shifted to defendants becomes manifest." 41
Under the Summers approach, the plaintiff must establish an in-
jury, a breach of duty (negligence) on the part of each defendant, and
that one of the defendants caused the injury; which amounts to a prima
show that he received an injury from an external force applied while he was
unconscious in the hospital. Id. at 492-93, 154 P.2d at 690. The court relied
on the fact of the defendants' superior knowledge and the special relationship
between the plaintiff and each defendant, in reaching its decision. Id. at
492-93, 154 P.2d at 690-91. Ybarra was later cited by the California Supreme
Court as precedent for its decision in Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 86-87,
199 P.2d 1, 4 (1948). For a discussion of Summers, see notes 38-44 and accom-
panying text infra.
38. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
39. Id. at 82-83, 199 P.2d at 2.
40. Id. at 84, 199 P.2d at 2. The plaintiff was actually struck by two
bullets, only one of which caused substantial injury. Id. at 84, 199 P.2d at 3.
41. Id. at 86, 199 P.2d at 4. The court based its decision on policy con-
siderations, stating that it was unfair to leave the plaintiff remediless where
both defendants were negligent and had brought about the situation in which
the plaintiff was unable to identify the cause of the injury. Id. The Cali-
fornia courts have applied the Summers rationale to a variety of factual situ-
ations. For instance, in Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, a father and son drowned
in defendant's motel swimming pool. 3 Cal. 3d 756, 478 P.2d 465, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 745 (1970). The court found that, having been required by statute to
provide a lifeguard or to place a warning at the pool, the defendants were
negligent in not doing either. Id. at 763, 478 P.2d at 467-68, 91 Cal. Rptr.
at 748. According to the court, this finding presented an even stronger case
than Summers for shifting the burden of proof of causation to defendants.
Id. at 773, 478 P.2d at 476, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 756. The Haft court reasoned
that, in Summers, the uncertainty of proof, "while emanating from the de-
fendants' conduct, was not a foreseeable consequence of defendants' negli-
gence. In the instant case, ... [however,] the absence of definite evidence
on causation is a direct and foreseeable result of the defendants' negligent
failure to provide a lifeguard." Id. at 773, 478 P.2d at 476, 91 Cal. Rptr.
at 756.
California courts have also applied alternative liability to automobile
accidents involving several vehicles where the plaintiff is unable to apportion
the damages caused by each tortfeasor; the result has been to shift the burden
of proof to any defendant who might have contributed to the injury to prove
that his negligence was not a cause of the harm. See, e.g., Eramdjian v. Inter-
state Bakery Corp., 153 Cal. App. 2d 590, 315 P.2d 19 (1957) (the plaintiff
was thrown from a motorcycle and then run over by a truck); Copley v. Putter,
93 Cal. App. 2d 453, 207 P.2d 876 (1949) (defendants' cars collided almost
simultaneously with the plaintiff's); Cummings v. Kendall, 41 Cal. App. 2d
549, 107 P.2d 282 (1940) (defendants negligently engaged in auto race). How-
ever, these cases differ from Summers in that each negligent driver may have
made some contribution to the injury, while, in Summers, only one defendant
was responsible for the damage. See Lareau v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co.,
44 Cal. App. 3d 783, 790-92, 118 Cal. Rptr. 837, 841-42 (1975).
1002
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facie case of negligence against the defendants as a group.42 Following
this showing by the plaintiff, the burden of proof shifts to the de-
fendants, all of whom are held liable if they cannot prove which one
of them was responsible for causing the injury.43 Any particular
defendant is released from liability upon a showing that it could not
have been the cause of plaintiffs' injury.4
4
Many courts in other jurisdictions have adopted the Summers ra-
tionale;45 it has even been extended to situations where not all de-
fendants were proved negligent. 46 In a New Jersey case, Anderson v.
Somberg,47 alternative liability was applied against a physician,
a hospital, a medical supply distributor, and a manufacturer of surgical
instruments, after the plaintiff was injured when an instrument broke
in his spinal canal during an operation.48 The Anderson court, rely-
ing upon Summers,49 not only shifted the burden of proof on the
causation issue to the defendants,50 but also stated that the jury must
find at least one defendant liable.51
C. Enterprise Liability
Enterprise liability provides a third theory of recovery for a plain-
tiff who is unable to identify the defendant responsible for her in-
42. 1 F. HARPER Se F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTs 703-04 (1956). Summers
holds liable a defendant for whom the probability of being the cause-in-fact of
injury is no greater than 50%. See Comment, supra note 1, at 986. The
presumption is justified, however, because with all tortfeasors joined there is a
100% probability of causation collectively. Id.
43. 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 42, at 703-04.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Bowman v. Redding & Co., 449 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(burden of proof of causation shifted to the defendants if the plaintiff could
establish that both defendants were wrongdoers and one or the other had
caused the death of the plaintiff's decedent); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich.
App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1979) (alternative liability applied in a DES case);
Thrower v. Smith, 62 A.D.2d 907, 406 N.Y.S.2d 513, aff'd, 46 N.Y.2d 835, 386
N.E.2d 1091, 414 N.Y.S.2d 124 (1978) (multiple car collision case); Hood v.
Hagler, 606 P.2d 548 (Okla. 1979) (plaintiff bitten by one of two roaming
dogs; burden shifted to dogs' owners to exonerate themselves); Snoparsky v.
Baer, 439 Pa. 140, 266 A.2d 707 (1970) (plaintiff injured by a stone thrown by
one of the defendants; if all defendants were proved negligent, the plaintiff
is entitled to a shift in the burden of proof as to causation); Sommers v.
Hessler, 227 Pa. Super. Ct. 41, 323 A.2d 17 (1974) (plaintiff injured in a
spitball fight on a school bus; burden of proof on causation shifted to defend-
ants). For a discussion of Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., see notes 124-32 and accom-
panying text infra.
46. Anderson v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 423 U.S.
'929 (1975); see notes 47-51 and accompanying text infra.
47. 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975).
48. 67 N.J. at 294, 338 A.2d at 3. As in Ybarra, while at least one of the
defendants was responsible for the injury, the plaintiff was unable to make
the necessary identification. Id. at 296-97, 338 A.2d at 4.
49. Id. at 302, 338 A.2d at 6.
50. Id. at 302, 338 A.2d at 7.
51. Id. at 303, 338 A.2d at 7. This was a remarkable result, because the
court decided that no matter what the evidence, the jury could not find that
every defendant had exonerated itself.
10031980-81]
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juries. The purpose of the theory is to alleviate the necessity of proving
which of many defendants was the cause of injury,52 and the effect
is to hold all defendants jointly liable.53 The theory originated in
Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 54 where several children were
injured by blasting caps in a series of separate accidents.55 In separate-
actions which were consolidated for trial,5 6 representatives of the in-
jured children brought suit against six blasting cap manufacturers 57 who
comprised virtually the entire blasting cap industry of the United
States.58 The plaintiffs' contended that the defendants had created an
unreasonable risk of injury by failing to place warnings on the caps
and by failing to take other safety precautions.59 The plaintiffs' main-
tained that the industry practice of delegating safety functions to a
trade association, which collected statistics on accidents and had consid-
ered and rejected the idea of labelling individual caps, demonstrated
conscious agreement among the defendants sufficient to impose joint-
liability.6 0
The Hall court, citing as precedent the principles inherent in work.
men's compensation statutes and the doctrine of respondeat superior,6 '
where employers are held vicariously liable because they are "the most
strategically placed participants in a risk-creating process .. "... 62 held
that the entire blasting cap industry could be held jointly liable.69
Under this novel enterprise liability theory, plaintiffs would have to
prove defendants' joint awareness of the risks and their joint capacity
52. See Comment, supra note 1, at 995.
53. Id. See also Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &: Co., 345 F. Supp. 353,
378 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
54. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
55. Id. at 359.
56. Id. at 358. The cases were consolidated because they were closely
linked in litigation history and underlying legal theory. Id.
57. Id. at 359. In Hall v. El. DuPont de Nemours & Co., the plaintiffs
claimed that they could identify the manufacturer of the injury-producing cap,
while the manufacturer could not be identified in Chance v. E.L DuPont de
Nemours & Co. Id. at 358. It is the Chance portion of the opinion which is
discussed herein.
58. Id. at 358.
59. Id. at 359.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 376.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 376-78. The court reasoned that while in some instances pre-
cautions could best be taken by the individual manufacturer or supplier, in
other situations adequate safety measures could only be undertaken at the
industry level. Id. at 377. Thus, the entire blasting cap industry would be
held jointly liable because it could better bear the costs and eliminate the
risks than the individual manufacturers. Id. at 378.
[VOL. 26: p. 99T1004
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to reduce or affect those risks, 4 and the plaintiffs would then be re-
lieved of the burden of identifying the manufacturer of each individual
blasting cap.65 The entire industry would thus be held liable for harm
caused by its operations.66
64. Id. at 378. The court gave no indication as to what types of factors
would enter into this determination, except to note that the theory is par-
ticularly applicable to industries with a small number of producers. Id. This
observation intimates an intent that the individuals be involved in the process
to such an extent as to make it fair to hold them each liable. See Note, Joint
Liability May Be Imposed Upon All Members of an Industry and Their Trade
Association for Injury Caused by Defective Product Design if the Entire In-
dustry Cooperated in Creating the Design and the Specific Manufacturer of
the Injury-Causing Product Cannot Be Identified, 42 U. CIN. L. Rxv. 341, 345
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Joint Liability Note].
The Hall opinion may also be read as having developed a separate theory,
which combined elements of the concert of action and alternative liability
theories. See Note, Enterprise Liability - Entire Industry May Be Liable If
Impossible to Identify Actual Manufacturer of Defective Product, 19 WAYNE
L. REv. 1299, 1304 (1973). Under this hybrid approach, the plaintiffs' would
show that the defendants adhered to an industry-wide standard, and the bur-
den of proof as to causation would then shift to the defendants. 345 F. Supp.
at 373-74. The theory is similar to concert of action because it requires the
plaintiff to show a joint or common activity on the part of the defendants.
However, because the burden of proof as to causation is shifted to the de-
fendants, it also resembles the alternative liability theory. See id. See also
Note, Child Injured by Exploding Blasting Cap of Unknown Manufacturer
May Sue Entire Blasting Cap Industry Which Adheres to Common Safety Pro-
gram, 61 GEO. L.J. 1340 (1973).
Under this hybrid theory, several factors would be significant in demon-
strating joint control of the risk: the size and composition of the trade asso-
ciation's membership, its objectives in the field of safety, its internal decision-
making procedures, its information-gathering system, the safety program and its
implementation, and other activities with regard to safety. Hall v. E.I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. at 376. By studying these factors, the district
court evidently wished to determine whether the group was responsible for the
decision regarding non-labeling, and whether individual members participated
in the decision in a meaningful way. Joint Liability Note, supra at 345.
These factors would also seem to be relevant to the issue of joint capacity to
reduce or affect risks under the enterprise liability theory. Id. at 344 n.17.
"[R]egardless of which theoretical label is employed, the Hall court would
impose joint liability in the present case only upon a showing of concerted
activity in the face of known risks." Id. While the existence of a trade asso-
ciation was important in establishing joint control in Hall, the court stressed
that this factor was not essential in its finding. 345 F. Supp. at 374.
65. 345 F. Supp. at 379. The court acknowledged the possibility, raised
by the defendants, that the manufacturer of the injury-producing caps had not
been joined. Id. However, the court stated that this possibility did not affect
the plaintiffs' burden of proof. Id. So long as the plaintiffs proved that it
was more probable than not that the injury was caused by a cap made by
one of the named defendants, the possibility of additional, unnamed defend-
ants would not prevent a judgment for the plaintiffs. Id.
66. Id. at 358. Because the court later severed and transferred the cases
after consideration of the choice of law issues, the theory of enterprise liability
was never applied to these facts. Chance v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
371 F. Supp. 439 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
Under still another articulation of enterprise liability, a plaintiff would be
required to prove seven elements: 1) the plaintiff is not at fault for the in-
ability to identify the causative agent, rather, this is due to the nature of the
i0051980-81]
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III. THREE APPROACHES TO RESOLVING THE DES
IDENTIFICATION DILEMMA
Recent cases have suggested three approaches to resolving the iden-
tification problem, drawn from the three theories previously discussed.
A. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories
Plaintiff Judith Sindell brought a class action 67 against ten drug
manufacturers, alleging that the manufacturers were jointly liable for
her injuries which resulted from her mother's ingestion of DES.68 While
Sindell was unable to identify the manufacturer of the drug taken by
her mother and thus responsible for her injuries, 69 she alleged that the
defendants were jointly liable because of their express and implied
agreements to collaborate in, rely upon, and adopt each other's testing
and marketing methods.7 0
defendant's conduct; 2) a generically similar defective product was manufac-
tured by all the defendants; 3) the plaintiff's injury was caused by this defect;
4) the defendants owed a duty to the plaintiff's class; 5) there is clear and
convincing evidence that the plaintiff's injury was caused by the product of
some one of the defendants; (for example, the joined defendants accounted
for a high percentage of such defective products on the market at the time of
plaintiff's injury); 6) there existed an insufficient, industry-wide standard of
safety as to the manufacture of the product; and 7) all defendants were tort-
feasors. Comment, supra note 1, at 995. Although this theory combines
aspects of both alternative liability and concert of action, it is derived mainly
from alternative liability in that the basic premise is that one of the defend-
ants probably caused the plaintiff's injury. Id. at 996. While in the classic
alternative liability case all defendants are joined, this theory suggests that in a
DES case, the joined manufacturers account for 75-80% of the market. Id.
at 996. This departure from the usual requirement of joinder of all defend-
ants is justified by the addition of an element of proof to the plaintiff's case
that derives from the concert theory: the plaintiff must prove the existence of
an insufficient industry-wide safety standard. Id. at 996-97. Whereas parallel
behavior among the defendants would be sufficient to meet this standard,
without evidence of tacit agreement or understanding, imitative drug research,
joint submission of clinical data, and parallel marketing practices would demon-
strate an industry-wide safety standard. Id. at 996. In terms of causation,
"the industry-wide standard becomes itself the cause of plaintiff's injury ....
Therefore, each industry member has contributed to plaintiff's injury." Id. at
997.
67. This was a consolidation of two class action suits. Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories and Rogers v. Rexall Drug Co. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,
85 Cal. App. 3d 1, 149 Cal. Rptr. 138, 141 (1978) (Opinion omitted in 85 Cal.
App. 3d, further references will be only to 149 Cal. Rptr.). The class consisted
of female residents of California who had been exposed to DES before birth,
and who may or may not have known of the dangers of DES. Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 285 (1980).
68. The plaintiff alleged that she developed precancerous lesions or tumors
of the vagina, cervix and breast and a cancerous bladder tumor as a result of
her mother's ingestion of DES. 149 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
69. 149 Cal. Rptr. at 142.
70. Id. at 141. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants knew or should
have known that DES was neither safe for use by pregnant women nor effec-
1006 [VOL. 26: p. 997
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The trial court dismissed the action 71 on the ground that no cause
of action was stated since there was no identification of the defendant
whose DES had harmed the plaintiff.72 The California Court of Ap-
peals reinstated the action,73 finding that the complaint stated a cause
of action under the concert of action and alternative liability theories.7 4
On review, the Supreme Court of California disagreed with the lower
court's determination regarding the applicability of the concert of ac-
tion and alternative liability theories, and also concluded that the en-
terprise liability theory was inapplicable. 7  Nevertheless, the court
held that the plaintiff's right of action was not precluded by her in-
ability to identify the specific manufacturer of the DES which her
mother had ingested.70 Rather, the court found that she had stated
a cause of action under a new theory - market-share liability.77
The Sindell court, in considering the alternative liability theory,
accepted the defendants' argument that, since only five of the two hun-
dred companies which manufactured DES had been joined as de-
fendants, there was no rational basis on which to infer that any named
defendant had caused the plaintiff's injuries.78 The court, noting that
in Summers all responsible parties had been joined, concluded that the
Summers rule of alternative liability was not applicable to a situation
where there was a possibility that none of the joined defendants had
caused the injury.79
tive to prevent miscarriages. 26 Cal. 3d at 594, 607 P.2d at 925-26, 163 Cal.
Rptr. at 133-34. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendants did not ade-
quately test DES for safety and effectiveness. Id. The plaintiff further
alleged that the defendants knew or should have known that DES is car-
cinogenic, and that the defendants individually and in concert promoted, ap-
proved, authorized, acquiesced in and reaped profits from the sale of DES to
pregnant women. Appellant's Opening Brief in the Court of Appeal of the
State of California at 6-10, Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 85 Cal. App. 3d 1,
149 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1978); Additional Brief of Appellant, Judith Sindell, in
the Supreme Court of the State of California at 4-5, 8-11, Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied,
101 S. Ct. 285 (1980).
71. 149 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 143.
75. 26 Cal. 3d at 598, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
76. Id. at 610-13, 607 P.2d at 936-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-46.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 602-03, 607 P.2d at 930-31, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138-39.
79. Id. The plaintiff relied on three cases cited in Summers as supporting
the application of alternative liability to a situation involving fewer than all
possible tortfeasors. Id. at 602 n.15, 607 P.2d at 930 n.15, 163 Cal. Rptr. at
138 n.15. The Sindell court stated, however, that these cases were decided on
a concert of action theory. See Benson v. Ross, 143 Mich. 452, 106 N.W.
1120 (1960); Moore v. Foster, 182 Miss. 15, 180 So. 73 (1938); Oliver v. Miles,
144 Miss. 852, 110 So. 666 (1927). The court noted that comment (h) to § 4331B
of the Restatement of Torts states that, while the rule of alternative liability
has only been applied where all tortfeasors are joined as defendants, modifica-
10071980-81]
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The California court next considered and rejected use of the con-
cert of action theory,80 stating that the defendants' alleged failure to
test the drug adequately or to give sufficient warning of its dangers did
not constitute concert of action.8l  Moreover, the court rejected the
plaintiff's assertion that, since the defendants had engaged in parallel
or imitative practices and had relied on each others' promotional and
marketing techniques, the defendants had acted in concert.82 Instead,
the court described these actions as a common industry practice and
stated that to apply the concert of action theory to the case at bar
would so expand the doctrine as to "render virtually any manufacturer
liable for the defective products of an entire industry." 83
tion of the rule could be allowed where the situation calls for it. 26 Cal. 3d
at 602 n.16, 607 P.2d 931 n.16, 163 Cal. Rptr. 139 n.16. The California court
relied on comment (h) in developing the theory of market-share liability.
An argument made by the defendants, was that a predicate to shifting
the burden of proof under the alternative liability theory is that the defend-
ants have greater access to information regarding the identity of the manu-
facturer of the injury-producing product. Id. at 600, 607 P.2d at 929, 163 Cal.
Rptr. at 137. The court rejected the defendant's contention that the plaintiff
was in a better position to make the identification, and stated that for the
purposes of the appeal it would be assumed that the plaintiff could not iden-
tify the manufacturer whose drug caused her injuries. Id. at 600-01 & n.12, 607
P.d at 929-30 & n.12, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 137-38 & n.12. The supreme court
recognized that the defendants also lacked information on this point and that
the circumstances appeared to render identification by either party impossible.
Id. at 600-01, 607 P.2d at 929-30, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 137-38. The plaintiff's
analogy to Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d 756, 478 P,2d 465, 91 Cal. Rptr.
745 (1970), where the lack of evidence of causation was a direct result of de-
fendants' negligence, and the burden of proof was therefore shifted to the
,defendants, was also rejected. 26 Cal. 3d at 601 & n.14, 607 P.2d 930 & n.14,
136 Cal. Rptr. at 138 & n.14. See note 41 supra. The Sindell court labelled
it merely speculative whether plaintiff's mother would have recorded the name
of the manufacturer if the DES she took had been labelled as experimental.
26 Cal. 3d at 601 n.14, 607 P.2d at 930 n.14, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138 n.14. While
the defendants did not have greater access to information regarding identifi-
cation of the manufacturer, the California court stated that this factor was not
resent in Summers and thus was never required in order for alternative
iability to apply. Id. at 600, 607 P.2d at 929, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
80. 26 Cal. 3d at 603-06, 607 P.2d at 931-33, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139-41.
81. Id. at 605, 607 P.2d at 932, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
82. Id. According to the court's interpretation of the concert of action
theory, the plaintiff must prove a tacit understanding or a common plan among
the defendants to fail to conduct adequate tests or to give sufficient warnings,
and also that the defendants had aided and encouraged each other in these
omissions. Id. The Sindell court rejected the plaintiff's allegation that a
charge of concert could be based on the production of DES from a common
and mutually agreed upon formula, stating that the formula is a scientific
constant which all manufacturers must follow. Id. at 605, 607 P.2d at 933,
163 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
83. Id. at 605, 607 P.2d at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141. Distinguishing the
concert of action cases cited by the plaintiff from the present case, the Sindell
court stated that these cases had involved a smaller number of defendants,
whose actions resulted in a tort against a single plaintiff, usually over a shorter
span of time, and that the defendant was either a direct participant in the act
or encouraged or assisted the person who caused the injury. Id. The court
also distinguished Orser v. George, 252 Cal. App. 2d 660, 60 Cal. Rptr. 708
[VOL. 26: p. 9971008
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The Sindell court declined to apply the enterprise liability theory
for three reasons.8 4 First, there were at least two hundred manufac-
turers of DES, and the Hall court had cautioned against use of the
theory in a case involving a large number of producers.85 Second, the
plaintiff could not show that the defendants had jointly controlled
the risk.86 In Hall, joint control of the risk had been based upon the
fact that responsibility for the formulation of safety standards had been
delegated to a trade association; here, no such trade association of the
DES manufacturers existed.87 Moreover, the plaintiff had failed to
meet the standard for joint control of the risk under a concert of ac-
tion theory.88 Finally, the court acknowledged the federal govern-
ment's role in setting standards for the testing and manufacture of
drugs, and stated that it would be unfair to impose liability simply
for following government-imposed standards.8 9
Having discarded all of the extant theories which would have al-
lowed the plaintiff to recover,90 but persuaded by strong policy argu-
ments that the plaintiff ought to be compensated,91 the Sindell court
developed the theory of market-share liability. The supreme court
(1967), because the defendant there may have known that the other defendants'
conduct was tortious towards the plaintiff, may have given them substantial
assistance and encouragement, and may have separately been a breach of duty
towards the plaintiff. 26 Cal. 3d at 606, 607 P.2d at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at
141. See notes 25-29 and accompanying text supra. Furthermore, the supreme
court declined to apply the concert theory because of its doubt as to whether
a tacit understanding to fail to perform an act could be the basis of a charge
of concert. 26 Cal. 3d at 606, 607 P.2d at 933, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
84. 26 Cal. 3d at 609-10, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143. The
court explained the theories of enterprise liability developed in Hall and
in Comment, supra note 1. See notes 52-66 and accompanying text supra.
85. 26 Cal. 3d at 609, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
86. Id.
87. See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
88. 26 Cal. 3d at 609, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
89. Id. at 609-10, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143. The court stated
that federal regulations may specify the type of tests to be performed, the type
of packaging to be used, and the standards to be followed in the manufacture
of the drug. Id. n.26.
90. See notes 78-89 and accompanying text supra.
91. Id. at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. The court attached
great importance to the Summers' reasoning that, as between an innocent plain-
tiff and negligent defendants, the defendants should bear the cost of injury.
Id. at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. In reasoning closely
parallel to Summers, the court also noted that, while neither party was at fault
in failing to prove causation, the defendants' conduct in marketing a drug
with delayed effects was a significant factor in creating the problem. Id.
Other policy considerations taken into account were that the defendants were
better able to bear the costs of injuries, and that holding the defendants liable
would provide an incentive to product safety. Id.
1980-81] 1009
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shifted the burden of proof of causation to the defendants, upon the
plaintiff's showing that those manufacturers whose sales of DES ac-
counted for a "substantial share" of the market were joined as de-
fendants.92 Failing to prove that its drug was not the one which had
injured each individual plaintiff, each defendant manufacturer would
be held liable for the proportion of the judgment represented by its
share of the DES market.9 3 Anticipating that some discrepancy be-
tween market share and liability will occur under the new doctrine,
the California court reasoned that the theory would treat each de-
fendant fairly because "each manufacturer's liability would approxi-
mate its responsibility for the injuries caused by its own products." 94
Thus, the court stated that the difficulty in apportioning damages and
in defining the relevant market should not militate against adoption of
the market-share liability theory. 95
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Richardson opined that the ma-
jority's holding allowed the plaintiff to recover damages without proof
that any defendant had either in fact caused or probably caused the
plaintiff's injuries.96 Moreover, Justice Richardson observed that
market-share liability would fall disproportionately on those manufac-
turers amenable to suit in California,97 would treat DES-plaintiffs more
92. 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. The court
did not state what would constitute a substantial percentage of the market.
93. Id. Defendants can bring in other manufacturers through cross-
complaints. Id.
94. Id. The court acknowledged that minor discrepancy is inevitable and
that a defendant's liability may differ from what its share of the market would
justify. Id. at 612-13, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
95. Id. at 613, 607 P.2d at 937-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145-46. The court
likened the problem of apportionment of damages to the problems confronted
by a jury in applying comparative negligence, noting that in neither case could
mathematical precision be expected. Id. at 612-13, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal.
Rptr. at 145. While also noting that there were practical problems to be
worked out, such as a time-frame and area for market share, as well as the
difficulty in ascertaining what proportion of the drug was used as a miscar-
riage preventative, the court indicated that these problems would be worked
out at trial. Id. at 613, 607 P.2d at 937-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145-46.
96. Id. at 614, 607 P.2d at 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146 (Richardson, J., dis-
senting). Under the majority's approach, Justice Richardson objected that "a
particular defendant may be held proportionately liable even though mathe-
matically it is much more likely than not that it played no role whatever in
causing plaintiffs' injuries." Id. at 616, 607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147
(Richardson, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Justice Richardson con-
sidered such a result to be contrary to established tort principles which require
more than a mere possibility of causation. Id. at 616, 607 P.2d at 940, 163
Cal. Rptr. at 148 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 617, 607 P.2d at 940, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 148 (Richardson, J., dis-
senting). Justice Richardson contended that assuming no other state would
adopt such a rule, those defendants brought to trial in California would bear
joint responsibility for 100% of the plaintiffs' injuries although their market-
share was considerably less. Id.
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favorably than other tort plaintiffs,98 and would be harmful from a
social policy viewpoint.99
B. Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly and Co.
In an action by eight daughters of DES users against twenty-two
-drug manufacturers, 100 the New Jersey Superior Court stated that the
identification problem posed two separate issues: 101 first, the inability
to identify the precise causative agent,102 and second, the possibility
98. Id. at 618, 607 P.2d at 941, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 149 (Richardson, J., dis-
senting). Justice Richardson explained that plaintiffs in ordinary tort cases
take a chance on whether the defendant is amenable to process and financially
solvent, whereas these plaintiffs are given a wide selection of defendants from
which to choose. Id. Moreover, according to Justice Richardson, the theory
bases liability upon the defendant's wealth. Calling this a "deep pocket" theory
of liability, he stated that it "fasten[s] liability on defendants" because they are
better able to bear the cost of injuries than the plaintiffs. Justice Richardson
'continued, stating that "a defendant's wealth is an unreliable indicator of
fault, and should play no part, at least consciously, in the legal analysis of the
problem." Id.
99. Id. at 620, 607 P.2d at 942, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 150 (Richardson, J., dis-
senting). Justice Richardson feared that the decision will discourage pharma-
ceutical research and development and the dissemination of new drugs. Id.
Justice Richardson questioned whether liability would be imposed in this
manner if the injury was to surface in two or three generations instead of one,
and also raised the point that the theory could be applied to other industries
with adverse economic consequences. Id. at 620, 607 P.2d at 942, 163 Cal.
Rptr. at 150 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
100. Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly and Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305
(1980). Linda Ferrigno and her mother instituted a class action suit in 1976.
Id. at 558, 420 A.2d at 1308. The Ferrignos sought to amend the complaint
to add additional plaintiffs. Id. at 559, 420 A.2d at 1309. Shortly afterwards,
a second suit was instituted by the plaintiffs named in the amended complaint;
this suit sought to certify a defendant class. Id. The court permitted the
amended complaint in the first action and consolidated the two actions. Id.
Certification as to both plaintiff and defendant classes was later denied. Id.
Five of the eight plaintiffs were unable to identify the defendant whose drug
had caused the injury. Id. at 561 & n.1, 420 A.2d at 1310 & n.l. The claims
of Linda Ferrigno and her mother were settled. Id. at 559, 420 A.2d at 1309.
All other claims remained. Id.
101. Id. at 565, 420 A.2d at 1312.
102. Id. The plaintiffs asserted that their inability to identify the manu-
facturer of the DES taken should not bar recovery; rather, liability should be
borne by each manufacturer in proportion to the defendant's market share.
Id. at 561, 420 A.2d at 1310. The court chose, on its own motion, to con-
sider this and other legal issues raised in advance of trial. Id. at 558, 420
A.2d at 1308.
In one previous DES case which had been reviewed by the New Jersey
Superior Court, Lyons v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labs, Inc., the plaintiff had
identified the manufacturer whose pills her mother took and reached a settle.
ment both with Premo, the manufacturer, and Chemetron, which had acquired
the firm which sold DES to Premo. 170 N.J. Super. 183, 188-89, 406 A.2d
185, 188 (1979). Motions for summary judgment by the other defendant drug
.companies were granted, and were affirmed on appeal. Id. at 189, 197, 406
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that the causative agent was not among the defendants before the.
court.103 While it has been subsequently overruled,104 the Ferrigno,
decision shows an interesting approach taken by one court to resolving
the DES identification dilemma. The court viewed Anderson v. Som-
berg,106 as resolving the first issue. The court read that case as holding
that, where a plaintiff, through no fault of her own, is unable to iden-
tify which of several defendants harmed her, it becomes the defend-
ants' burden for each to establish that it was not the cause of harm.106 ,
In addressing what it considered the more difficult second issue,' 07
the Ferrigno court, again relying upon Anderson,0 8 decided that the
burden of proof could be shifted to the defendants,1 9 even in the
absence of joinder of all potential defendants." 0 While the court in-
terpreted the plurality opinion in the Anderson case as assuming that
all potential defendants were before the court, the Ferrigno court con-
A.2d at 188, 192. The Lyons court would not allow the plaintiff to apply the
alternative liability or the enterprise liability theories where the source of the
injury was known. Id. at 192-93, 406 A.2d at 190. Moreover, the Lyons court
also rejected the plaintiff's reliance on the concert of action theory. Id. at
193, 406 A.2d at 190-91.
103. 175 N.J. Super. at 565, 420 A.2d at 1312.
104. Namm v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 178 N.J. Super 19, 427 A.2d 1121
(1981). The court declined to apply the alternative liability theory, based in
part on the fact that not all those who could have been responsible for plain-
tiffs' injury were before the court. Id. at 28-32, 427 A.2d 1125-28. The court
stated that application of the theory here "would result in the taking of the
property of all the named defendants in order to pay for harm which may have
been caused by only one of the defendants, or even by one who is not a party
to the lawsuit .... ." Id. at 33, 427 A.2d at 1128. Another policy considera-
tion present in other alternative liability cases but lacking here was any sug-
gestion that the defendant was better able to make the identification of the
responsible manufacturer. Id. at 32, 427 A.2d at 1127. The enterprise liability
theory was also rejected by the court, on the grounds that it would violate the
well-settled principle of tort law that manufacturers are liable only upon proof
that the product was defective and that the defect arose while the product
was in the defendant's control. Id, at 35, 427 A.2d at 1129. Any such drastic
change in the law, according to the Namm court, would have to be accom-
plished by the supreme court or the legislature. Id.
105. For a discussion of Anderson v. Somberg, see notes 47-51 and accom-
panying text supra. The Anderson court stated that its decision was based on
the facts that the plaintiff was unconscious when the injury occurred, the de-
fendants all owed a duty to the plaintiff, all possible defendants were before
the court, and that it was clear that one defendant was liable. 67 N.J. at
302-03, 338 A.2d at 7. The dissent was concerned that the responsible party
may not have been before the court, and therefore did not believe that the
jury should be required to find at least one defendant liable. Id. at 306, 310-11,
338 A.2d at 9, 11 (Mountain, J., dissenting).
106. 175 N.J. Super. at 566, 420 A.2d at 1312.
107. Id. at 565, 420 A.2d at 1312.
108. Id. at 567, 420 A.2d at 1313.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 567, 420 A.2d at 1313.
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,cluded that even the dissenters in the Anderson case would uphold the
shifting of the burden of proof.",
The Ferrigno court further concluded that the Anderson rationale
of alternative liability should be extended beyond the particular facts
of that case and applied to the case at bar.1 12 The court reasoned that,
in both Ferrigno and Anderson, the plaintiffs had been innocent vic-
tims of an unforeseeable injury."13 Also, in both cases, all of the de-
fendants were potentially at fault 114 and all of the defendants owed
a special duty to the plaintiff."15 The court considered the Ferrigno
defendants to be more culpable than those in Anderson, however, in
that they caused the identification problem by making a fungible good
with long-delayed effects.1 16 And finally, since all of the defendants in
111. Id. at 566, 420 A.2d at 1313. The Anderson court. had stated:
Identifying the responsible party is merely a matter of elimination.
To instruct the jury that it must return a verdict against one or more
of the defendants is simply requiring it to determine upon the evi-
dence which defendants, if any, have exculpated themselves. For the
jury under these circumstances to conclude that no defendant is liable
would be a contradiction in logic.
67 N.J. at 304, 338 A.2d at 8. The Ferrigno court stated that, while the dis-
senters in Anderson would not make this presumption, and therefore did not
agree that the jury should be mandated to find liability, the Anderson dissenters
zdid agree that the burden of proof should be shifted to the defendants. 175
N.J. Super. at 566-67, 420 A.2d at 1313. Therefore, according to the Ferrigno
court, the Anderson dissent recognized that the case should not be dismissed
merely because of the possibility that the causative agent was not before the
,court. Furthermore, the Ferrigno court reasoned that "the plurality which
went well beyond this position would agree." Id. at 567, 420 A.2d at 1313.
Anderson thereby provided the court with precedent for the application of
alternative liability to a setting where less than all potential defendants had
been joined. Id.
112. 175 N.J. Super at 567, 420 A.2d at 1313. The court noted that
Anderson was decided in the context of a hospital operating room, and that
the Anderson court attempted to restrict its language to "the type of case we
consider here." 67 N.J. at 298, 338 A.2d at 5.
113. 175 N.J. Super. at 568, 420 A.2d at 1313. The plaintiff in Anderson
was unconscious on the hospital operating table at the time of injury, whereas
the plaintiffs in Ferrigno had not yet been born when the injury occurred. Id.
114. 175 N.J. Super. at 567-68, 420 A.2d at 1313. The court stated that all
of the defendants in Ferrigno were associated with "the manufacture, mar-
keting or distribution of DES at a time and place when and where their prod-
uct possibly could be the one ingested by plaintiff's mother." Id.
115. Id. at 568, 420 A.2d at 1313. In Anderson, the defendants were
"those who had custody of the patient, and who owed him a duty of care as
to medical treatment, or not to furnish a defective instrument." 67 N.J. at
'298, 338 A.2d at 5. The court stated that the defendants in Ferrigno had a
special responsibility, even if DES was deemed unavoidably unsafe, to see that
the drugs were properly prepared and marketed and that proper warnings were
given. 175 N.J. Super. at 568, 420 A.2d at 1313.
116. 175 N.J. Super. at 568, 420 A.2d at 1313-14. The court noted that
in these circumstances it was reasonable for the consumer to have discarded
any records. Id. at 568, 420 A.2d at 1314.
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Ferrigno were alleged tortfeasors, whereas it was presumed in Anderson
that only one defendant was at fault, the shift in the burden of proof
was thought to be more compelling." 7
Acknowledging the Sindell court's rejection of the alternative lia-
bility theory," 8 the Ferrigno court nevertheless was satisfied that, under
New Jersey law, the theory could and should be applied." 9  Having
found the alternative liability theory a satisfactory method for provid-
ing recovery to the plaintiff, the New Jersey court declined to consider
either the enterprise liability or the market-share liability theories 120
and also rejected the concert of action theory on these facts.12' The
court stated that any defendant could exculpate itself by identifying
the actual manufacturer, by showing that it did not manufacture DES
until after plaintiff was born, by showing that its drug could not have
reached the location where the plaintiff-mother purchased it, or by
117. Id. at 568-69, 420 A.2d at 1314. Two theories were suggested in
Anderson as the cause of the instrument's breaking; that it was negligently
used, or that the instrument itself was defective. 67 N.J. at 296, 338 A.2d at 4.
There was no indication that both these factors were present. In Ferrigno,
as in all DES cases, it was alleged that all defendants acted tortiously in pro-
ducing, marketing and selling the drug. 175 N.J. Super. at 560-61, 420 A.2d at
1309-10.
118. 175 N.J. Super at 569-70, 420 A.2d at 1314.
119. Id. The court noted the strong policy in favor of allowing innocently
injured plaintiffs to recover. Noting that the Sindell court's rejection was
premised on the finding that not all responsible parties were joined as de-
fendants, the Ferrigno court observed that this had not deterred the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Anderson. Id. at 569-70, 420 A.2d at 1314.
The court also analogized the situation of defendants here to that faced
by defendants in multiple car collision cases, where one tortfeasor might escape
liability and another be required to pay more than his share of the damages.
Id. at 570, 420 A.2d at 1315. The car collision situation does not provide
a perfect analogy to the case at bar. In the chain collision case, each defend-
ant may have contributed to the injury, and the problem is merely that of
apportionment. Since all defendants who may have contributed to the injury
are identifiable, a defendant can only escape liability if he meets the requisite
burden of proof. In DES cases, however, it is not readily apparent which
manufacturers are potential defendants.
120. Id. at 570, 420 A.2d at 1315.
121. Id. at 570, 420 A.2d at 1315-16. The Ferrigno court stated that the-
Lyons court had disposed of the concert of action theory. The Lyons court
rejected the concert of action theory after distinguishing defendants' 1940 and
1947 applications to market DES. Lyons v. Premo Pharmaceuticals Labs, Inc.,
170 N.J. Super. 183, 406 A.2d 185 (1979). For a discussion of Lyons, see note
102 supra. While the 1940 applications of the defendants might have sup-
ported a charge of concert, these applications did not seek to market DES for
use as a miscarriage preventative. 170 N.J. Super. at 193-94, 406 A.2d at
190-91. The court pointed out that, since DES is safe for many purposes and
is still in use, the drug companies' conduct in 1940 could certainly not be con-
sidered tortious. Id. It was the 1947 applications which sought to market
DES for use during pregnancy which were allegedly tortious, and no concert
was alleged as to these applications. Id. The Ferrigno court also quoted
Sindell. See notes 80-83 and accompanying text supra.
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showing that its drug was not the same shape, size, or color as that in-
gested by the mother.12
However, the court decided that, for the purposes of allocating
damages among the defendants, it would adopt the Sindell rationale
and hold each defendant liable for the proportion of the judgment rep-
resented by its share of the market.
12 3
C. Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co.
Reviewing the grant of summary judgments in favor of defend-
ants,124 the Michigan Court of Appeals, having noted that the concert
of action theory was "well-established," 125 found that the plaintiff had
stated a cause of action under that theory 126 and held that the sum-
mary judgments which had been granted by the trial court were im-
proper. 127
Moreover, in discussing the theory of alternative liability, the Abel
court noted that, although there were no Michigan cases directly on
122. 175 N.J. Super. at 571-72, 420 A.2d at 1316. Those defendants un-
able to exculpate themselves would be held jointly and severally liable. Id.
at 572, 420 A.2d at 1316.
123. Id. at 572-73, 420 A.2d at 1316.
124. Abel v. Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1979). The
plaintiffs alleged that defendants' were liable under concert of action, alterna-
tive liability, and enterprise liability theories for injuries caused by their
mothers' ingestion of DES. Id. at 66-67, 71, 289 N.W.2d at 22, 24. The plain-
tiffs charged the defendants with negligence, breach of express and implied
warranties, fraud and conspiracy; and that the named defendants constituted
all of the known manufacturers of DES whose products were distributed in
Michigan during the relevant time period. Id. at 66-67, 289 N.W.2d at 22.
The plaintiffs further claimed that they were unable to determine which
particular defendant had caused their harm but that this should not bar
recovery because the defendants were jointly and severally liable and only the
named defendants could have caused the harm. Id.
The trial court granted summary judgment for all of the defendants
against those plaintiffs unable to determine which defendant's product had
harmed them, and for all of the defendants, except the one named, against
those plaintiffs who alleged that a particular defendant caused their harm.
Id. at 68, 289 N.W.2d at 23. Summary judgment was also granted as to the
claims of enterprise liability. Id.
125. Id. at 72, 289 N.W.2d at 24. For a discussion of the concert of action
theory, see notes 23-31 and accompanying text supra. justice Souris' opinion
in McCoy v. DeLiefde was cited by the court as precedent for the concert of
action theory. See McCoy v. DeLiefde, 376 Mich. 198, 135 N.W.2d 916 (1965)
(three defendants negligently shot in plaintiff's direction, all would be held
liable if plaintiff could show that defendants acted in concert).
126. 94 Mich. App. at 72, 289 N.W.2d at 25. The plaintiffs' concert claim
was based on the allegation that all the defendants caused the marketing of
DES, and that this activity caused the plaintiffs' injuries. Id. at 71-72, 289
N.W.2d at 24-25. The court emphasized that, on appeal from an order grant-
ing summary judgment, only the sufficiency of the pleadings was at issue and
that the plaintiffs would have to adduce evidence to support the allegation of
concert at trial. Id. at 72, 289 N.W.2d at 25.
127. Id. at 72, 289 N.W.2d at 25.
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point, 28 the burden of proof on causation had been shifted to the
defendants in other contexts under Michigan law.1 29 In adopting the
alternative liability theory, 8 0 the Michigan court cautioned that each
plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that each de-
fendant had breached its duty of care, and that the harm which she
suffered had been caused by her mother's ingestion of DES which had
been manufactured by one of the named defendants.' 8 ' According to
the Abel court, the defendants would then be required to apportion
the damages among themselves.'8 2
128. Id. at 74, 289 N.W.2d at 25.
129. See Snider v. Bob Thibodeau Ford, Inc., 42 Mich. App. 708, 202
N.W.2d 727 (1972) (burden of proof shifted to car manufacturer and car dealer
in suit for injuries caused by brake failure); Holloway v. General Motors
Corp., 403 Mich. 614, 271 N.W.2d 777 (1978) (citing Summers, court declared
that the plaintiff, whose husband was killed and daughter injured in a car
collision, did not have to show the precise nature of the defect in defendant's
ball joint assembly); Maddux v. Donaldson, 362 Mich. 425, 108 N.W.2d 33
(1961) (multiple car collision; burden of proof as to apportionment of damages
shifted to defendants).
The Abel court found unpersuasive defendants' argument that in prior
alternative liability cases the tortious acts had occurred within a brief time
span. 94 Mich. App. at 76 n.5, 289 N.W.2d at 26 n.5. The court stated: "It
hardly comports with the notions of fairness which underlies the adoption of
[alternative liability) to hold that a tortfeasor who continues his wrongful con-
duct over a period of years will be absolved of responsibility for his acts as
a reward for his persistence in wrongdoing." Id.
130. 94 Mich. App. at 76, 289 N.W.2d at 26-27. The plaintiffs alleged
alternative liability in that all defendants acted wrongfully but only one
defendant caused harm to each individual plaintiff. Id. at 71-72, 289 N.W.2d
at 24.
131. Id. at 76, 289 N.W.2d at 26-27. The court's language, in stating that
a plaintiff must show that a named defendant manufactured the DES, indi-
cates that alternative liability cannot be applied where fewer than all potential
defendants have been joined. Id. Thus the decision is contrary to the result
reached in Ferrigno, where the action was allowed to proceed without joinder
of all manufacturers of DES. 175 N.J. Super. at 570, 420 A.2d at 1315.
132. 94 Mich. App. at 76, 289 N.W.2d at 26. The court stated that the
problem was essentially one of apportionment of damages, as in Maddux v.
onaldson, 362 Mich. 425, 108 N.W.2d 33 (1961). 94 Mich. App. at 76, 289
N.W.2d at 26. This is a misunderstanding because in Maddux each defendant
contributed to the injury, whereas only one defendant caused the injury to
any DES plaintiff. What the court seems to be saying is that after alternative
liability has been proved, defendants will have to apportion the damages. The
court declined, without discussion, to adopt the enterprise liability theory. 94
Mich. App. at 77, 289 N.W.2d at 27.
A dissenting judge charged that the plaintiff's were calling for strict lia-
bility in a product liability action Which was not Michigan law. Id. at 84,
289 N.W.2d at 30 (Moore, J., dissenting). Justice Moore stated that the plain-
tiff could only recover on a negligence or a warranty theory, both of which
require proof that the defendant supplied the defective product. Id. at 85,
289 N.W.2d at 30 (Moore, J., dissenting). A shift in the burden of proof,
according to the dissent, was only relevant when liability had been established
and only the question of the apportionment of damages remained. Id. at 87,
289 N.W.2d at 31 (Moore, J., dissenting).
What Justice Moore seems to have misunderstood is that the plaintiffs will
have to prove a breach of defendant's duty before alternative liability will
1016
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IV. THE THREE APPROACHEs ANALYZED
The reasoning of the Abel court is well-supported by precedent. 1
By slightly extending Michigan law with the adoption of the alterna-
tive liability theory,184 the Abel decision merely brings Michigan law
into line with the law of many other jurisdictions.l8 In contrast,
the Ferrigno court based its decision to expand the scope of the alter-
native liability theory upon the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision
in Anderson.13 6 In particular, the Ferrigno court relied upon the An-
derson court's assumption that all of the defendants were before the
court.18 7 However, where the Anderson court made this assumption
because of the particular factual situation of the case, one in which
the existence of other defendants was merely speculative, 88 in DES
cases it is more than likely that not all of the defendants can be
joined.139 Moreover, it is doubtful whether the Anderson court in-
apply to shift the burden of proof on the causation issue. See text accom-
panying note 37 supra. Thus the "wrongful act" of the defendants will be
established before alternative liability is applied. Justice Moore stated that a
shift in the burden of proof can only occur after the liability of at least one
defendant acting in concert has been proven. 94 Mich. App. at 89, 289 N.W.2d
at 32 (Moore, J., dissenting). A shift in the burden of proof is relevant only to
the alternative liability theory, and not to the concert theory. For a discus-
sion of these theories, see notes 23-51 and accompanying text supra. In addi-
tion, one defendant can never act in concert, since there must be at least two
defendants before there can be a common plan. See notes 23-SI and accom-
panying text supra.
Enterprise liability was rejected by the dissent as a &round for recovery.
94 Mich. App. at 92, 289 N.W.2d at 33 (Moore, J., dissenting). Justice Moore
stated that at least one defendant must be found liable before others can be
drawn in for, "if none is identified, why should we not conclude none are
liable? . . . We cannot promiscuously make an entire industry liable without
some liability being first established against someone." Id. at 90, 289 N.W.2d
at 32 (Moore, J., dissenting). The point was also made that the lack of in-
formation as to identification was not the fault of the defendants but was due
to the passage of time. Id. at 90, 289 N.W.2d at 33 (Moore, J., dissenting).
Finally, Justice Moore expressed the opinion that collective liability would
violate constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection. Id. at
91-92, 289 N.W.2d at 33 (Moore, J., dissenting). This was based on the belief
that enterprise liability would result in the taking of property to pay for harm
caused by the conduct of another defendant or by one not a party to the suit,
over whom the defendants had no control. Id.,
133. For a discussion of the concert of action and alternative liability
theories relied on in Abel, see notes 23-51 and accompanying text supra.
134. 94 Mich. App. at 76, 289 N.W.2d at 26-27.
135. See note 45 supra.
136. See notes 105-17 and accompanying text supra.
137. See notes 105 & Ill supra.
138. The Anderson court stated that "involvement by any person other
than the defendants actually before the court below has never been asserted as
anything other than pure and undisguised speculation." 67 N.J. at 305, 338
A.2d at 8.
139. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163
Cal. Rptr. at 144.
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tended to allow a presumption of joinder of all defendants in any case
where alternative liability is applied.140
Unlike the New Jersey court, which molded the Anderson rationale
to fit the facts of a DES case, the California Supreme Court in Sindell
clearly acknowledged that it was taking a novel step beyond the Sum-
mers holding by extending alternative liability to a situation where
not all of the defendants were joined, and in using market-share data
to apportion damages. 141 This step was justified by strong public
policy considerations which support the recovery of an innocent plain-
tiff over the protection of allegedly negligent defendants. 42
Although the alternative liability theory was the common device
used by the Sindell court 148 as well as the Abel 144 and Ferrigno145
courts to provide the plaintiff with a cause of action, the courts dif-
fered in their resolution of the problem caused by the inability to join
all of the potential defendants. These contrasts among the courts can
be seen, for example, in the language used by the Abel court indicating
that it would require joinder of all of the potential defendants. 46
The Sindell and Ferrigno courts recognized that this was a virtual im-
possibility.147 However, the Sindell court required that those manu-
facturers whose sales of DES accounted for a "substantial share" of the
market be joined,148 while the Ferrigno court imposed no floor on the
number of manufacturers who must be joined.149
While the requirements regarding the joinder of defendants im-
posed by the Sindell and Ferrigno courts go far toward resolving the
DES plaintiff's dilemma of being unable to identify the manufacturer
of the drug ingested by her mother, 5 0 it is submitted that the Ferrigno
140. The Anderson court never stated that it would presume joinder of
all defendants in alternative liability cases, and, to the contrary, took time to
point out that the existence of other defendants was merely speculative. See
note 138 and accompanying text supra.
141. 26 Cal. 3d at 611-12, 607 P.2d at 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45
142. See note 91 supra.
143. 26 Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
144. 94 Mich. App. at 76, 289 N.W.2d at 26-27.
145. 175 N.J. Super. at 571, 420 A.2d at 1316.
146. 94 Mich. App. at 76, 289 N.W.2d at 26-27.
147. 26 Cal. 3d at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144. This
assumption was explicit in Ferrigno's discussion of the use of alternative lia-
bility in the absence of joinder of all defendants. See notes 107 & Ill and
accompanying text supra.
148. See note 92 and accompanying text supra. This requirement was
also imposed in Erlich v. Abbatt Laboratories, No. 76-4331, Slip Op. at 18-19.
(Ct. C.P., Phila. Cty., Pa., Feb. 2, 1981).
149. This issue was never raised in the Ferrigno decision.
150. Many problems remain for the DES plaintiff. First, because the
cases came before the courts on procedural motions, the plaintiffs have not
yet proven the allegations of negligence which are a prerequisite to shifting
the burden of proof to the defendants. See notes 67-74 & 100 and accom-
panying text supra. Each individual plaintiff must also establish that DES
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result is inferior to the result reached in Sindell. This is because the
joinder of only a small number of manufacturers would destroy the un-
derlying presumption of the alternative liability theory, i.e., that with
all manufacturers joined there is a high probability of causation col-
lectively.151 In the interests of fairness to the defendants and the preser-
vation of traditional tort principles, the courts should encourage
joinder of the maximum number of defendants.
Addressing the issue of the apportionment of damages among de-
fendants, the Abel court stated only that the defendants would be re-
quired to apportion damages among themselves, 52 while the Sindell
and Ferrigno courts stated that they would hold each defendant liable
for damages in proportion to its market share. 53 However, an un-
resolved issue in both Sindell and Ferrigno is whether the damages
awarded by the jury will be paid in full by the defendants joined, or
whether only that proportion of the damages will be paid which cor-
responds to those defendants' percentage-share of the market. It is
suggested that the latter result would better achieve the courts' policy
of balancing the interests of plaintiffs and defendants and achieving a
result which is fair to each. 3 4 This method of allocation would allow
the Sindell court more flexibility in defining what constitutes a "sub-
stantial share" of the market, since the court would not have to be
concerned that by setting too low a figure it would put an undue bur-
den on the joined defendants. Moreover, this would protect the Fer-
rigno defendants against the imposition of an unfair burden which
would result from the joinder of only a small number of manufacturers.
A question left unanswered in each of these three cases is whether
a time-lag between the injury and its manifestation is necessary for the
application of the doctrines developed by each court. It is submitted
that the answer to this should be in the negative since, where the re-
sponsible manufacturer cannot be identified, the presence or absence of
was the cause of her cancer. This will presumably be done on the basis of
patterns shown by statistical data which may or may not be sufficient to prove
cause-in-fact. See Comment, supra note 1, at 964-65 n.5. In Sindell, there
is the additional problems of whether a sufficient number of DES manufac-
turers are amenable to suit in California to constitute a "substantial share" of
the market. See note 92 and accompanying text supra. This will depend
largely on how the court defines "substantial," and on whether the relevant
market is the national market, the California market, or that of some smaller
sub-region.
151. See Comment, supra note 1, at 986.
152. 94 Mich. App. at 76, 289 N.W.2d at 26.
153. See notes 93-95 & 122-23 and accompanying text supra.
154. This was the interpretation of Sindell and Ferrigno adopted by the
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas in Erlich v. Abbott Laboratories, No.
76-4331, Slip Op. at 22 n.10. (Ct. C.P., Phila. Cty., Pa., Feb. 2, 1981). Finding
the issue premature, the Erlich court did not decide whether to adopt a
market-share approach for the apportionment of damages.
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lapsed time in a case in no way changes the equities between the--
parties.155
V. CONCLUSION
Unlike the Sindell and Ferrigno courts, the Abel court did not
break new ground; 250 and while the court in Abel did express concern
for fairness to the plaintiffs, the decision provides little hope for future
DES plaintiffs in light of the fact that the standards of proof set by
the court are, it is submitted, simply too stringent for plaintiffs to-
meet.15 7
In contrast, the Sindell and Ferrigno decisions provide great hope
for recovery by DES plaintiffs. Moreover, the same policy considera-
tions which led the California and New Jersey courts to their respective
holdings should also extend the opportunity for recovery to plaintiffs
injured in other circumstances, such as by pollution or industrial waste,
where particular tortfeasors are seemingly untraceable. 58  'Finally, it
is hoped that the Sindell and Ferrigno decisions will force manufac-
turers to show more concern for product safety, or, at the very least,
provide drug manufacturers with an incentive to differentiate their
products and, thus, eliminate the identification dilemma faced by DES
plaintiffs.
Linda Mogul Madway
155. Since Sindell and Ferrigno are derived from Summers and Anderson
respectively, in neither of which was there a time-lag between the injury and
its manifestation, there would be no point in adding additional requirements.
before application of the doctrines developed in the DES cases.
156. See note 133 and accompanying text supra.
157. This is based on the belief that the Abel court required joinder of
all potential defendants, a requirement that is a virtual impossibility. See
notes 131 & 146-47 and accompanying text supra.
158. See Comment, Industry-Wide Liability, 13 SUFFoLK L. REv. 980,.
1001-02 (1979).
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